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Stereotypes, Theory of Mind, and the Action-Prediction Hierarchy 
Evan Westra 
Forthcoming in Synthese 
Abstract: Both mindreading and stereotyping are forms of social cognition that play a 
pervasive role in our everyday lives, yet too little attention has been paid to the question of 
how these two processes are related. This paper offers a theory of the influence of 
stereotyping on mental-state attribution that draws on hierarchical predictive coding 
accounts of action prediction. It is argued that the key to understanding the relation between 
stereotyping and mindreading lies in the fact that stereotypes centrally involve character-trait 
attributions, which play a systematic role in the action-prediction hierarchy. On this view, 
when we apply a stereotype to an individual, we rapidly attribute to her a cluster of generic 
character traits on the basis of her perceived social group membership. These traits are then 
used to make inferences about that individual’s likely beliefs and desires, which in turn 
inform inferences about her behavior.  
1. Introduction
Interpreting behavior in terms of underlying mental causes, or ‘mindreading,’ is widely 
agreed to be crucial to our ability to succeed in complex social environments: in order to 
predict and interpret behavior, we need to be able to reason about the hidden, mentalistic 
causes of action (beliefs, desires, intentions, etc.). But would-be mindreaders face a persistent 
challenge: behavior is quite often ambiguous, and consistent with many different possible 
mental causes. A smile from a stranger on the subway, for instance, could be a signal of 
recognition, an act of flirtation, an absent-minded reverie, or simple politeness. A shout 
from a neighbor's apartment might be an outburst of rage from a domestic disturbance or 
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excitement at a sudden turn of events in a football game. Inferences from behavioral effects 
to mental causes are always underdetermined. 
When navigating social environments, we must somehow sort through these 
potential mentalistic causes, and arrive at the most probable interpretation. These abductive 
inferences require us to draw on our own background knowledge to fill in the gaps between 
behavioral observation and mental cause. Sometimes, we may fill in these gaps with our 
knowledge of the mindreading target herself and her individual history: if we know someone 
well, we are often able to infer what she is thinking quite accurately. But just as often, we 
interact with complete strangers, about whom we know nothing. In these cases, we may 
instead fall back on stereotypes about the target’s social group membership. And this is a 
point where pernicious social biases can enter into the mindreading process distorting our 
interpretations of the social world. 
It is not common to view stereotyping through the lens of theory of mind. Part of 
this may be an artifact of disciplinary boundaries: while theory of mind tends to fall under 
the scope of cognitive and developmental psychology, stereotyping is more often 
approached via social psychology. This is less true of social neuroscience, however, where 
there is some recognition that these two processes at least share overlapping neural 
substrates: stereotyping is significantly associated with activity in the dorsal medial prefrontal 
cortex and the anterior temporal lobe, which, together with the temporal parietal junction, 
superior temporal sulcus and precuneus, form the so-called ‘mentalizing network’ (Amodio 
2014; Van Overwalle 2009). But more importantly, we also know that stereotyping and 
mindreading are both things that we do spontaneously whenever we observe or interact with 
other people (Bargh et al. 1996; Mason et al. 2006; Samson et al. 2010; Schneider et al. 2012). 
During social encounters, we rapidly and unconsciously retrieve information about an 
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individual’s social category while simultaneously keeping track of her current mental states. 
This raises the important question of whether and how this information is integrated in the 
service of planning our own actions. 
There are a number of behavioral findings scattered throughout different empirical 
literatures suggesting that stereotypes and mental-state attributions may interact in a very 
concrete way. For instance, Sagar and Schofield showed sixth-graders images and vignettes 
of ambiguous dyadic interactions between students, such as a student bumping into another 
in a hallway, asking for food in the cafeteria, poking another student, and taking a pencil 
without asking. These are behaviors that could be interpreted as the product of either a 
harmful or benign intention, depending on the participants’ background assumptions. 
Critically, the authors systematically manipulated the race of the actor in each dyad. Nothing 
else about the observable behavior changed across these scenarios except the actors’ race. 
The authors found that the behaviors of black actors were interpreted as more mean and 
threatening than the identical behaviors from white actors (Sagar and Schofield 1980). That 
is, participants seemed more inclined to attribute harmful rather than benign intentions to 
the black actors than to the white actors.  
Similarly, McGlothlin and Killen showed first- and fourth-graders a series of 
ambiguous images (e.g. a child picking up money on the ground behind another child, or a 
frowning child sitting on the ground in front of a swing with another child standing behind 
it) (Mcglothlin and Killen 2006; McGlothlin and Killen 2010). Once again, these images 
could be interpreted as depicting a benign action or a harmful action. As with Sagar and 
Schofield, McGlothlin and Killen varied the race of the actors, leaving everything else about 
the images exactly the same. They found that children were more likely to interpret the 
image as depicting a scenario in which a moral transgression had taken place (e.g. the child 
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picking up the money from the ground was stealing rather than helping), and to rate the action 
depicted as more impermissible when the actor was black than when the actor was white. 
Considering that children of this age reliably use information about intentions when judging 
whether an actor is blameworthy for a harmful action (Cushman et al. 2013; Killen et al. 
2011; Leslie et al. 2006), it is plausible1 that these divergent moral judgments are driven by 
divergent intention attributions. Thus, in both of these studies, knowledge of an actor's race 
seems to bias participants' mental-state attributions. 
Background knowledge about the gender of an individual can also bias how we 
interpret his or her behavior. Condry and Ross showed college students videos of children 
wearing gender-disguising snow jackets playing roughly in the snow, and asked them to rate 
the aggressiveness of a target child's behavior. This situation was intentionally ambiguous, 
because the same roughhousing behavior could either be the product of playful intentions or 
harmful intentions. Across conditions, the dyads were labeled as male-male, female-female, 
or male-female. They found that boy-boy interactions were rated as less aggressive and more 
playful than girl-boy and girl-girl interactions (Condry et al. 1985). The authors speculated 
that this was due to the fact that play-fighting is a stereotypical play activity for boys, but not 
for girls; thus, boys were interpreted as having benign intentions, and girls were interpreted 
as having harmful ones. Expectations about gender even seem to bias how we interpret the 
behavior of infants: Burnham and Harris showed both college students and new mothers 
short videos of ambiguously gendered infants, which were randomly assigned either male or 
female names. Participants consistently judged the behaviors of infants with male names to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1 One could come up with other, non-mentalistic interpretations of this result. For example, children might 
simply be relying on associations between race and moral transgression. But given what we know about 
children’s ability to represent intentions, and their ability to use this information in moral judgments, these 
alternative interpretations seem rather implausible. Further research would be necessary to rule them out 
completely, however.	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be stronger and more masculine. In both of these studies, participants all saw the same 
videos. The only things that affected their interpretations were their background stereotypes 
about gender (Burnham and Harris 1992). 
Ageist stereotypes appear to affect the way we judge the accuracy of people’s 
memories. For instance, a wide range of evidence shows that mock jurors tend to treat the 
eyewitness testimony of younger children as less credible that the identical testimony when 
given by adults, judging that their memories are in general less reliable, and that they are 
more prone to manipulation and confabulation (Goodman et al. 1984, 1987). An analogous 
effect also appears to afflict elderly witnesses, who are perceived by mock jurors as less 
competent and as having more inaccurate memories than younger adult witnesses; further, 
these judgments appear to be predicted by measures of ageist stereotypes (Mueller-Johnson 
et al. 2007). Tellingly, these attitudes also seem to be shared by real police officers (Wright 
and Holliday 2005). In effect, these studies tell us that we are much more likely to attribute 
false beliefs to both very young and old individuals than to other adults. 
In real-world social encounters, this apparent interaction between stereotyping and 
mental-state attribution could have serious consequences: a teacher might judge a child's 
misstep as an accident, or as an intentional act of mischief; a doctor might hear her patient 
describe symptoms, and interpret it as an earnest desire for pain-relief, or as a deliberate 
deception to get an opioid prescription (Drwecki et al. 2011); a juror might dismiss the 
eyewitness testimony of an elderly person on account of her age; a police officer might 
interpret a thrashing man in handcuffs as either attempting to attack or panicking and 
struggling to breathe, based on a judgment about the man's underlying intentions (Goldstein 
and Schweber 2014; Spaulding 2017). In short, if stereotypes affect how we represent one 
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another's mental states, this may provide a potent avenue for discrimination to manifest 
itself in nearly all of our social interactions.  
The central goal of this paper will be to suggest a theoretical account of how 
stereotypes might fit into the architecture of mindreading. I will propose that the source of 
this relationship can be traced to a core mentalistic feature of stereotype content, namely, the 
fact that stereotypes are structured around attributions of character traits. I will then introduce a 
model of action prediction that shows how character-trait attribution can influence how we 
represent other agents' mental states, and show how this explains the stereotype-
mindreading relation (Westra 2017). 
In section 2, I will identify several aspects of stereotypes that, I will go on to argue, 
are relevant to their connection with mindreading. In section 3, I will briefly discuss how 
stereotypes might fit into existing accounts of mindreading and folk psychology. In section 
4, I will introduce a hierarchical predictive coding model of mental-state attribution, and 
show how character-trait attribution fits into that cognitive architecture. Section 5 will show 
how stereotypes fit into the action-prediction hierarchy, while Section 6 will discuss the 
various experiential and motivational factors that might moderate the effects of stereotypes 
on mindreading. 
2. Stereotype content: character traits and essences 
Stereotypes are stored bodies of rapidly accessible semantic information about the generic 
characteristics and attributes of social groups (Amodio 2014).2 They can manifest themselves 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2 Social psychologists and neuroscientists distinguish stereotypes from ‘prejudice’: while the former is a 
semantic structure, and encodes descriptive properties of groups, the latter is an evaluative structure, and 
encodes valenced information. Prejudice and stereotypes are known to dissociate on a number of behavioral 
and neural measures (Amodio and Devine 2006; S. J. Gilbert et al. 2012). In this paper, I am specifically 
focused on stereotypes, and leave prejudice to one side.  
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as consciously endorsed explicit attitudes, or as unconscious attitudes that one might 
consciously disavow (Banaji et al. 1993). They can be triggered by perceptual cues, such as 
facial features, skin color, and accent (Mason et al. 2006). Stereotypic information can be 
activated very quickly and efficiently, and can have rapid biasing effects on attention, on the 
encoding and retention of information, and on a wide range of behaviors (Bargh et al. 1996; 
Correll et al. 2002; Donders et al. 2008; Hehman et al. 2014; Macrae et al. 1994; Rothbart et 
al. 1979); these effects are especially pronounced when under cognitive load (Macrae et al. 
1993; Van Knippenberg et al. 1999; Wigboldus et al. 2004).  
Beyond their cognitive profile, stereotypes also possess a distinctive kind of content. 
Intuitively, stereotypes can contain a wide range of information about a social group: styles 
of dress, music, food, accent, social practices, and various other kinds of parochial 
information might be contained in a stereotype. As long as a property can be attributed to 
members of a social group, it might seem that anything could become part of the content of 
a stereotype. This may be correct; however, the systematic study of stereotype content has 
also revealed that they possess an underlying structure and internal logic (Bastian and 
Haslam 2006; Fiske et al. 2002; Levy et al. 1998). At the core of this structure is the 
observation that many stereotypes seem to be about character traits:  temporally stable, 
unobservable psychological properties3 that have consistent effects on behavior across a 
wide range of different situations, such as laziness, intelligence, honesty, aggressiveness, and 
so on (Doris 2002). Upon a little reflection, this observation proves depressingly intuitive: 
we can all easily call to mind stereotypes about groups that are viewed as lazy, dishonest, 
greedy, unintelligent, aggressive, meek, and so on. This characterological dimension of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Note that these are properties that we tend to ascribe to character traits in our folk psychology. We may think 
of character traits this way even if the reality is quite different, as proponents of situationism about character 
have proposed (Doris 2002). Also, the notion of character here is not meant to be a specifically moral, 
evaluative construct, and should be read as roughly synonymous with ‘personality.’	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stereotypes, I will go on to argue, plays a key role in their connection to mental-state 
attribution. 
That stereotypes are structured around character traits is borne out by prominent 
theories of stereotype content and person perception. The Stereotype Content Model 
(SCM), for instance, proposes that most stereotypes are structured around two fundamental 
dimensions of trait attribution: 1)the warmth dimension, which tracks attributions of traits 
like trustworthy/untrustworthy, friendly/unfriendly, kind/unkind, and gentle/aggressive; 
and 2) competence dimension, which tracks attributions of traits like 
intelligent/unintelligent, skillful/clumsy, confident/meek, and serious/frivolous (Cuddy et 
al. 2007; Fiske 2015; Fiske et al. 2002, 2007).4 Across many cultures (Cuddy et al. 2009), 
most stereotypes contain traits that fall into four distinct clusters: high warmth/high 
competence; high warmth/low competence; low warmth/high competence; and low 
warmth/low competence. The high warmth/low competence cluster (which includes traits 
like friendly or nurturing, but also unskilled and unintelligent) represented paternalistic 
stereotypes that are typically applied to groups perceived to be non-threatening and of relatively 
low social status: the elderly, homemakers, children, and the mentally disabled. The low 
warmth/high competence cluster  
(e.g. intelligent but untrustworthy) represented envious stereotypes. This was applied to social 
groups viewed as both high status and threatening, such as lawyers, politicians, and 
professional women. The low competence/low warmth cluster represented contemptuous 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4 The warmth and competence dimensions are statistical posits that aim to explain recurring correlations 
between particular trait attributions (e.g. people who are judged as trustworthy also tend to be judged as 
friendly, kind, and gentle, and people who are viewed as intelligent also tend to be viewed as confident and 
serious). These two clusters of correlated traits appear throughout the trait-attribution literature, and have been 
given many labels besides warmth and competence: warm and cold (Asch 1946), social and intellectual 
(Rosenberg et al. 1968), self-profitable and other-profitable (Peeters 1983), morality and competence 
(Wojciszke 1994), and trustworthiness and dominance (Todorov et al. 2008).	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stereotypes (e.g. unintelligent, unskilled, and dishonest). This was applied to low status, 
unthreatening groups, such as the homeless, drug addicts, and welfare recipients. Finally, the 
high warmth/high competence cluster (e.g. honest, friendly, intelligent, and confident) 
tended to pick out various social reference groups – high status, nonthreatening groups viewed as 
prototypical of a given society (e.g. in the United States, the white middle-class). In some 
cultures, this cluster was also ascribed to the participant’s own social in-group (e.g. other 
undergraduate students).  
  Such stereotype-linked traits also have an effect on the kinds of traits that we infer 
on the basis of behavior. Normally, when we are given a piece of telling behavioral 
information about a person, we make a spontaneous trait inference about that individual 
(Uleman et al. 2008). We see this in the recognition probe paradigm (Uleman et al. 1996), in 
which participants are first presented with a sentence describing a behavior indicative of an 
underlying trait (e.g. ‘Alice solved the mystery halfway through the book,’ which implies that 
Alice is clever); next, subjects are presented with a word, and must judge whether or not it 
appeared in the sentence that was paired with that photo. When subjects see the trait word 
in question (e.g. ‘clever’), they are far slower to respond “no” than when presented with 
control sentences. However, if the agent in the sentence belongs to a social category that is 
inconsistent with the trait inference in question (e.g. ‘the garbage man solved the mystery 
halfway through the book,’) this effect on reaction time is attenuated (Wigboldus et al. 2003). 
In other words, stereotypical traits seem to crowd out trait inferences that we might make on 
the basis of behavioral information alone. 
The connection between stereotypes and character traits is also borne out in their 
relationship to people’s tacit beliefs about the nature of traits, or ‘implicit person theories’ 
(Dweck et al. 1995). In particular, entity theorists – people who believe more strongly in the 
	   10 
immutability of traits and are disposed to infer traits on the basis of slim behavioral evidence 
– are much more prone to stereotyping. Specifically, entity theorists are more likely to 
endorse stereotypic trait attributions, to see stereotypic traits as the product of innate 
biological differences between groups, to accept stereotypic explanations of behavior, to 
infer new stereotypes about novel groups, and to pay greater attention to stereotype-
consistent versus inconsistent information (Levy et al. 1998, 2001). The more strongly a 
person believes in stable, consistent character traits, it seems, the more likely she is to use 
stereotypes to reason about social categories.   
The connection between stereotyping and belief in immutable character traits reveals 
another distinctive aspect of their content: stereotypes are essentialized. Psychological 
essentialism is the tendency to view biological categories (such as species) as discrete natural 
kinds, and to believe that members of these kinds all share hidden, innately specified, 
immutable, and causally potent properties or essences that explain the observable features of 
those categories (Gelman 2003). Stereotypes about social categories such as race and gender 
lead people to view those categories as biologically based natural kinds with hidden, 
immutable essences (Keller 2005; Prentice and Miller 2007). Stereotypic thinking thus 
reflects a tendency to subsume some social categories into a broader intuitive conceptual 
framework for understanding the biological world. In turn, entity theorists’ tendency towards 
stereotyping and beliefs in the immutability and fixity of character traits is explained by a 
broader tendency towards essentialist thinking, about both individuals and certain social 
categories (Bastian and Haslam 2006; Haslam et al. 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006).5 Stereotypes are, 
at their core, essentialized character-trait attributions applied to social groups. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Most measures of social essentialism involve posing questions that probe beliefs about various components 
of essentialism for a given social group. For example, Haslam et al. (2000) provided adults with questionnaires 
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In sum, stereotypes are cognitively efficient mental representations that store 
information about social categories, which people draw on when making inferences about 
behavior. This information is organized in an essentialist fashion and has a strong 
characterological component. These facts will play a key role in the positive account that I 
present in section 5.  
3. Stereotyping and the mindreading literature 
Traditional accounts of mindreading, such as the simulation theory (ST) and the theory-
theory (TT), have not addressed the role of stereotyping in mental-state inference. However, 
stereotypes seem to fit naturally into a TT account, insofar as they consist in generalizations 
that could enter into theory-driven causal inferences (Gopnik and Wellman 1992, 2012); 
indeed, my account can be viewed as an extension of the theory-theory. If a tacit 
mindreading theory is able to encode the relationship between these generalizations and the 
formation of various mental states, then the information encoded in stereotypes could enter 
seamlessly into theory-driven mental state inference. It would be incumbent upon the 
theory-theorist, however, to specify the nature of this relationship. It is not enough to say 
that stereotype-based generalizations affect mental-state attributions in some way or other. 
The theory-theorist must also explain the manner in which stereotypes (with their specific 
type of content and processing profile) influence mindreading. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that included items about the naturalness, inherence, and immutability of various social categories, including 
age, ethnicity, religion sexual orientation, etc. For instance, the inherence item asked used the following 
prompt: “Some categories have an underlying reality; although their members have similarities and differences 
on the surface, underneath they are basically the same. Other categories also have similarities and differences 
on the surface, but do not correspond to an underlying reality (Haslam et al. 2000, p. 118).” Participants then 
rated social categories on a scale of ‘underlying reality or sameness.’ Another measure of essentialism often 
used with children is the adoption task, which asks children to imagine an individual from social category A 
being adopted at birth by a family from social category B, and then asking the child whether the individual will 
grow up to display more A-traits or B-traits (Gelman and Wellman 1991; Hirschfeld and Gelman 1997; Segall 
et al. 2015). 
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In contrast, it is less clear how the ST might accommodate stereotypes. Simulation-
based mental state inference relies upon one’s own decision-making procedures to ascertain 
how another person might be reasoning (Gordon 1986; Heal 1996). One way stereotypes 
might fit into this procedure is if we consider stereotypes about our own social group when 
we act. For instance, if I am an academic, and there is a stereotype about academics being 
snobbish, a belief about this stereotype might enter into my decision-making procedure 
when I act. The literature on stereotype threat suggests that we may sometimes do this 
(Spencer et al. 1999; Steele and Aronson 1995). For instance, Spencer et al. (1999) found that 
women tend to perform worse on a math test when they are first reminded of the stereotype 
that women tend to perform worse than men on such tasks. However, in a recent meta-
analysis of stereotype-threat findings, Flore and colleagues determined that stereotype-threat 
manipulations do not produce statistically significant effects on behavior (Flore and Wicherts 
2015). Thus, evidence from stereotype threat can provide only weak support for this 
simulationist proposal. While it may be true that we sometimes consider stereotypes about 
our own group when we act, it is not at all clear if this has a reliable effect on our behavior.  
Another possibility is that stereotypes might somehow provide the belief/desire 
inputs for a simulation-based mental-state attribution procedure, but that they do not 
themselves figure in our simulations. This proposal is more plausible, since it does not 
require us to posit that we regularly consider stereotypes about our own group in practical 
deliberation. However, it also departs from a pure simulation-based account of mental state 
attribution and moves into the territory of an ST/TT hybrid (Goldman 2006; Nichols and 
Stich 2003). In such an account, stereotype-based generalizations would simply figure into a 
theory of mental-state attribution, but not play any significant role in simulation-based 
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behavior prediction. Like the pure TT proposal sketched out above, this hybrid proposal 
would need to specify the relationship between stereotypes and mental states. 
A different possible relationship between mindreading and stereotyping is that they 
might constitute two entirely separate ways of predicting and interpreting behavior: sometimes, 
we predict behavior by reasoning about mental states; other times, we predict behavior by 
applying stereotypes. This idea has recently been proposed by defenders of folk-
psychological pluralism (Andrews 2008, 2012; Fiebich and Coltheart 2015).6 The general 
thesis of folk-psychological pluralism is that human beings do not just rely on mindreading 
to predict and interpret behavior – we also rely on a wide range of socio-cognitive strategies 
that do not involve representing mental states at all. Among these alternative socio-cognitive 
strategies, pluralists have suggested that stereotyping provides us with an entirely non-
mentalistic route to predicting and interpreting behavior.  
Fiebich and Coltheart (2015) provide a number of proposals for how non-
mentalistic, stereotype-based behavior predictions might work. The core mechanism 
underlying this form of prediction, according to their account, lies in the associations that we 
form on the basis of social group categories. At the most basic level, these might consist in 
associations between external cues to social group membership, particular situations or 
contexts, and particular behaviors (for example, police officers eating donuts in donut 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6 Andrews’ (2012) account of the relation between stereotyping and mental-state attribution is not entirely 
clear. Initially, she presents her account of stereotyping as one of many ways in which, ‘entire classes of 
behavior can be predicted, and even prognosticated, without the attribution of beliefs and desires [emphasis added]’ (p. 
68).  But elsewhere, she seems more open to a role for mental-state attributions in stereotype-based behavioral 
predictions: for instance, she writes, ‘when we stereotype others, we form expectations about people’s 
behaviors and their beliefs based on their group membership [emphasis added]’ (p. 86). One way to make sense 
of this tension would be if Andrews were distinguishing between mental-state attributions that occur via 
discrete acts of theorizing or simulation, and mental-state attributions that occur as the result of prior 
associations. That is, if we automatically apply a stereotype to a target, and that stereotype is associated with 
certain beliefs, we may incidentally come to attribute that belief to the target as well, without ever specifically 
reasoning about what their beliefs are. If this interpretation is correct, then my own account can be read as an 
argument for why the relation between mental-state attributions is not incidental at all, but rather quite 
systematic.  
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shops). These associations are automatically triggered when we observe members of the 
relevant social group (police) in the relevant situation (donut shop), leading to a particular 
behavioral expectation (eating donuts).  
A more complex form of stereotype-based behavioral prediction involves 
associations between observable group-membership cues, behaviors, situations, and 
personality traits. On this view, stereotype-based prediction does not rely on direct 
associations between groups and particular behavior-situation combinations; rather, these 
associations are built around representations of traits. For instance, traits like generosity 
might be associated with behaviors like leaving large tips at restaurants. Thus, when we come 
to associate generosity with a particular social group (say, uncles), and we observe a member 
of a group in a situation that activates a trait-based behavioral association, we come to expect 
the individual belong that group to perform that behavior. This proposal is initially 
promising, since, as I have noted, trait-attribution is a core aspect of stereotyping. 
It may be that associations like these ones explain some of the effects of stereotypes 
on our interpretations and predictions of behavior.7 However, they do not explain why 
stereotypes also affect our performance on mental-state attribution measures like the ones 
described in the introduction of this paper (i.e. that stereotypes seem to lead us to attribute 
different mental states to otherwise identical behaviors). If stereotypes really are alternative 
way of reasoning about behavior, and do not involve mental-state attributions at all, why 
should they also influence the way we attribute intentions and beliefs? This suggests that, pace 
the pluralists, stereotypes and mindreading are in fact causally and functionally related.8 
7 Although there are good reasons for thinking that the structure of stereotypes is not based solely on statistical 
associations (Hammond and Cimpian, forthcoming; del Pinal and Spaulding, forthcoming)	  	  8 For a more detailed critique of folk psychological pluralism, see Westra (2017).	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Stereotypes do not lead us to circumvent mindreading – they actually seem to interact with 
the mindreading process in a non-trivial way. 
Another possibility is that the effects of stereotyping on mindreading are related to 
our social motivations. Along these lines, Spaulding (2017) has suggested that stereotypes 
and information about social categories may interact with our social goals to affect both the 
inputs to the mindreading system and the way we process mental-state information. First, a 
target’s social group membership can provide us with a basis for determining the saliency of 
particular behaviors, which determines which information gets used in a particular mental-
state inference. For example, whether a target is recognized as high or low-status might 
affect whether they represent a potential threat, which would affect whether or not we 
allocate attention towards their movements. Second, we may sometimes use stereotypes as a 
cognitively efficient mindreading strategy, particularly when our social goals lead us to 
prioritize speed over accuracy in our mental-state attributions.  
Spaulding’s general point that social category information affects how we allocate 
cognitive resources towards a particular mindreading problem is an important one: we do 
not deploy our mindreading abilities in a unitary fashion across social contexts and targets. 
Rather, we engage in mindreading to the extent that it supports our own action plans, which 
may require varying degrees of accuracy and efficiency. The suggestion that stereotypes can 
be used as a strategy for mental-state attribution also seems to fit nicely with the cases of 
biased mental-state attribution mentioned in the introduction. But this idea also needs to be 
further developed. Stereotypes, as we saw, have very distinctive contents and conceptual 
structure: they are organized around clusters of character traits, and they are essentialized. 
Why does a class of cognitive representations with these specific features facilitate 
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mindreading? As we search for an answer to these questions, however, we should keep in 
mind Spaulding’s point about the effects of motivational factors upon mindreading. 
4. Character, mindreading, and hierarchical predictive coding 
In order to understand the relation between stereotyping and mindreading, it is useful to 
think about mindreading in terms of a hierarchical predictive coding account of cognition. 
Hierarchical predictive coding (HPC) refers to a family of models of neural information 
processing that heavily emphasize the importance of predictive processes in the way we 
represent and interact with the environment (Clark 2015; Friston and Kiebel 2009; Hohwy 
2013; Hohwy et al. 2008; Rao and Ballard 1999; Spratling 2016). On this approach, the 
contents of our perceptual, proprioceptive, and interoceptive representations are not just 
informed by bottom-up signals from the environment or body to the brain; they are also 
informed by top-down predictions based on statistically informed expectations about what 
those incoming signals will be. This is accomplished through the activity of generative 
predictive models that constantly produce hypotheses about incoming perceptual 
experiences, which are checked in turn against incoming sensory inputs. These models are 
hierarchically organized, such that higher-order models make predictions based on highly 
abstract, more stable regularities in the environment, while lower-order models make 
predictions based on more local, transient properties of the environment. For example, 
lower-order predictions about visual input might represent low-level properties like edges, 
surfaces, and colors, whereas higher-order predictions might represent more abstract 
properties, such as objects and category-membership. Higher-level predictions are passed 
down the predictive hierarchy, informing predictions at subordinate levels. And so the 
prediction that one is looking at a cup can inform predictions about the presence of edges 
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and surfaces, because these low-level properties tend to co-occur with instances of the 
category cup. Thus, the contents of our perceptions of the external environment are partly 
constituted by these top-down predictions.9  
4.1. The action-prediction hierarchy 
Several authors have used HPC to model theory of mind (Csibra, 2008; Hohwy and Palmer, 
2014; Hudson et al., 2016; Kilner et al., 2007; Koster-Hale and Saxe, 2013; Ondobaka et al., 
2015; Palmer et al., 2015; Westra, 2017). The key observation underlying this approach is that 
we tend to represent intentional actions hierarchically. To illustrate, take an ordinary 
intentional action: getting a glass of water from a pitcher in the fridge. This action begins 
with the formation of the goal of quenching your thirst. Fulfilling this goal requires you to 
form a number of sub-goals: walk over to the kitchen, take a cup, get the water from the 
fridge, fill the cup with water, and take a drink. Each of these sub-goals is in turn achieved 
via the formation of specific motor intentions: getting water from the fridge involves grasping 
the fridge door, pulling it open, reaching into the fridge, and so on. At the higher levels of this 
action hierarchy, the relevant mental states are more temporally stable: the goal to get a drink 
persists throughout the entire exercise until every sub-component of the action is complete, 
while the sub-goal to get the water jug from the fridge only persists for a portion of the 
overall action sequence; individual motor intentions last even less time. Intentional actions, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9 Because my account of mindreading and stereotyping is informal, it is likely to be consistent with a number of 
other computational approaches that treat cognition as a form of Bayesian inference, besides HPC (e.g. Gopnik 
and Wellman 2012; Lochmann and Deneve 2011; Solway and Botvinick 2012; Tenenbaum et al. 2011). The key 
features of any such model, as far as my account is concerned, would be 1) the hierarchical organization of 
mental-state inferences, where increasing levels in the hierarchy correspond to generative models producing 
hypotheses about properties of increasing temporal stability and abstractness, and 2) construing attention in 
terms of higher-order expectations about the precision of lower-order predictions (Hohwy 2012). My use of 
HPC reflects the fact that it incorporates these two features, and has also made important inroads into the 
mindreading literature (especially with respect to goal-based action prediction in the mirror neuron system 
(Kilner et al. 2007)). It does not entail a commitment to some of HPC’s more controversial elements, such as 
the free-energy formulation of prediction-error minimization (Friston and Kiebel 2009), or the idea that feed-
forward neural signals contain only information about prediction errors (Spratling 2013). 
18 
in other words, begin with more abstract, temporally extended mental states, and are realized 
through a hierarchy of increasingly transient states. 
As mindreaders capable of reasoning about mental states, we can exploit the 
hierarchical structure of intentional action for predictive purposes (Csibra 2008). To predict 
an agent's observable behavior, a mindreader can begin by attributing to her an overarching 
goal (e.g. getting a drink from the kitchen). She can then use this goal attribution to predict 
the target’s likely actions, starting with the sub-goals (e.g. going to the kitchen, retrieving a 
glass, opening the fridge, selecting a beverage). Each of these sub-goals can then be used to 
predict specific motor intentions (e.g. grasping the handle of the fridge and pulling the door 
open). At each level in this predictive process, the mindreader can use the superordinate, 
stable mental-state attribution as an overhypothesis, which assigns a prior probability 
distribution10 to the many subordinate, transient mental state hypotheses that are consistent 
with her observable behavior. This prior probability distribution, in turn, constrains which 
mentalistic hypotheses she actually considers. For example, if the mindreader infers that a 
target walking towards the kitchen has the goal of getting a drink, then she need only 
consider those subordinate mental state hypotheses that would lead to the satisfaction of 
that goal (e.g. getting a can of soda, drinking water from the tap, getting water from the 
fridge, etc.). She need not consider all the possible mental state hypotheses that would be 
consistent with the target's observable behavior (e.g. going to make a sandwich, going to 
empty the dishwasher, rearranging the pots and pans, etc.). This winnowing of the 
mentalistic hypothesis space can then iterate at each level of the action-hierarchy, yielding a 
concrete expectation about observable behavior – which, some proponents of hierarchical 
10 This model does not require that the agent literally represent the entire space of possible mentalistic 
hypotheses for a given behavior, nor assign a prior probability to each of these. Rather, the agent’s subjective 
prior probabilities could be interpreted as their propensity to sample from a hypothesis-generating mechanism, 
whose representational capabilities constitute the (latent) hypothesis space (Icard 2016; Perfors et al. 2011). 
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predictive theories of mindreading argue, manifest themselves as mirror-neuron activity 
(Csibra 2008; Kilner et al. 2007). When an action prediction does not match incoming 
inputs, an error signal is passed back up the action-prediction hierarchy, causing the internal 
psychological model that generated the prediction to be revised accordingly. This iterative 
combination of top-down predictions and error-driven learning provides mindreaders with 
an active, continually updating strategy for understanding the causal basis of the 
psychological world.  
4.2. Character and mental-state attribution11 
To see how representations of character traits fit into this hierarchy, we must first look at 
how they relate to our concepts of mental states like beliefs and desires. Character traits 
resemble other kinds of mental state representations in a number of ways: we tend to think 
of them as unobservable, internal properties of individuals that dispose us to act in certain 
ways. Different traits also seem to possess both cognitive and volitional elements, just like 
beliefs and desires: while traits like intelligence, paranoia, or gullibility have a distinct 
epistemic dimension, traits like friendliness and honesty seem almost desire-like. But if there 
is one property that character traits are thought to possess that distinguishes them from 
beliefs and desires, it is their temporal stability and consistency (Doris 2002).  
The key idea here is that a trait is not the sort of thing that could suddenly shift or 
disappear, depending on the time or the context. We expect character traits to persist in 
individuals, and to have reliable effects on their behavior far into the future. If, for instance, 
a person only intermittently tells the truth, we would not call that person honest. Rather, we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11 This account of the role of character-trait attributions in mindreading is based on a view developed in 
Westra (2017).	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expect traits like honesty to regularly manifest themselves in people’s behavior. In short, 
character traits are not thought to be readily changeable.  
Beliefs and desires are not like this: beliefs can be changed or discarded; desires are 
can be satisfied. If I incorrectly believe that New York City is the capital of the state of New 
York, but am told that the capital is really Albany, one would not expect me to persist in my 
belief, but to change it. Likewise, if I have a desire for a cup of coffee, and then I go and buy 
one and drink it, one would not expect me to continue to desire coffee, because my desire 
has been satisfied. Beliefs and desires, in other words, are inherently changeable.12  
A key difference between beliefs and desires and character traits, then, is that 
character traits tend to be viewed as highly temporally stable. If, as HPC theorists suggest, 
our action-prediction systems are organized into temporal hierarchies, then character traits 
would fit naturally into the upper levels of this temporally structured action-prediction 
hierarchy. This also suggests that representations of character traits may be used to make 
inferences about less stable mental states, such as beliefs and desires, which would in turn 
inform behavioral predictions. In other words, the mindreader’s background beliefs about a 
person’s character – their ‘inner nature’ – may inform the kinds of mental states that she 
ascribes to them.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12 Granted, we do hold on to some of our beliefs and desires for long periods of time. But this has nothing to 
do with the nature of beliefs and desires as such, and everything to do with independent facts about the world. If 
I persist in believing that Washington, D.C. is the capital of the United States, or that all bachelors are 
unmarried, it is because facts about the world (and the meaning of ‘bachelor’) make these beliefs true. Likewise, 
I may have standing desires for world peace and to win the lottery; what makes these desires persist is that my 
winning the lottery and world peace are unlikely to happen, and so my desires are destined to go unfulfilled. 
This is not so for the stability of character traits.  
Also, note that the beliefs and desires that we are often least likely to give up, such as deeply held 
moral convictions and values, are precisely those that we treat as part of our core identities, as essential to who 
we are (Strohminger and Nichols 2014).  They are, in other words, much more trait-like than our other 
attitudes.	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By way of illustration, suppose that you are on a walk with your friend George, and 
you both observe George's wife speaking with an attractive man. If you antecedently believe 
George to be insecure, you might expect him to form the belief that his wife is being disloyal 
to him; you might then expect him to become angry and make a scene. But if you 
antecedently believe George to be confident, you might instead expect him to believe that 
his wife is simply engaged in an innocent chat; you might then predict that George will 
pleasantly greet the pair. In short, depending on your background beliefs about George's 
competence traits (whether he is insecure or confident), you may end up attributing different 
stable background beliefs to him, which would then lead to different action predictions. 
Similarly, imagine that your friend Claire is either honest or dishonest (i.e. high 
warmth or low warmth), and that you see her happen upon a wallet full of cash on the street. 
If she is honest, we might expect her to desire to return the wallet to its owner, then form 
the intention to pick it up and bring it to the police station, and then pick it up and put it in 
her pocket. If Claire is dishonest, in contrast, we might expect her to desire to keep the cash 
for herself, then form the plan to discreetly pick it up, put it in her bag, and walk away.  
These examples show how trait attributions (on both the warmth and competence 
dimensions) could lead to cascading effects upon mental state attributions at various levels in 
the action-prediction hierarchy, from relatively stable background beliefs and desires to 
highly transient motor intentions and perceptual beliefs. In a hierarchical action-prediction 
system, particular trait attributions would affect the probability that an agent might form 
certain beliefs and desires. Given the many possible mental states that might cause a given 
behavior, background knowledge about personality traits would serve to render certain 
mental states more probable. High-warmth traits, for instance, would make desires with 
helpful contents much more probable, while low-warmth traits would do so for desires with 
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harmful or self-serving contents. High-competence traits might make true-belief or 
knowledge attributions more probable, while low-competence traits would predict false 
beliefs and ignorance. Competence traits might also be related to the attribution of 
intentions of plans that are likely to be successful. Thus, the attribution of stable character 
traits changes the probability distributions for hypotheses about beliefs and desires. These 
beliefs and desires would then inform hypotheses about more transient mental states and, 
ultimately, our predictions and interpretations of behavior. 
The fact that character traits occupy a relatively high position in the action-prediction 
hierarchy helps to explain a number of puzzling phenomena related to trait-attribution. For 
instance, it is well known that we often make very rapid, intuitive, ‘thin slice’ judgments 
about other individuals (which can be surprisingly accurate). We also use highly superficial 
information about facial features to make extremely rapid (i.e. under 100ms) inferences 
about traits such as trustworthiness and dominance (Bar et al. 2006; Todorov 2013; Todorov 
et al. 2008). Some populations are also prone to interpret behavior as the product of a 
person's character traits, rather than their situation, a phenomenon known as the 
‘correspondence bias’ or ‘fundamental attribution error’ (Gawronski 2004; D. T. Gilbert et 
al. 1995; Jones and Harris 1967; Ross 1977). If representations of character traits sit towards 
the top of the action-prediction hierarchy, and have significant downstream effects upon 
other forms of mental-state attribution, then it would make sense for this information to be 
prioritized, and processed as rapidly and efficiently as possible. Ironically, this means some 
of the most rapid inferences that we make about people are about what we take to be their 
deepest, most stable traits. 
To be clear, the claim here is not that mental states are attributed solely on the basis 
of prior character-trait attributions. Attributions of mental states at all levels of the hierarchy 
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are most likely supported by numerous socio-cognitive mechanisms, such as gaze-following, 
the detection of biological motion, and emotion-recognition systems, as well as default 
strategies like the projection of one’s own beliefs, and statistical information acquired via 
experience. The action-prediction system, in short, is likely to receive both bottom-up and 
top-down inputs from a number of sources. However, characterological information may 
play an important role in informing the probabilities that we ascribe to alternative mentalistic 
hypotheses generated at lower levels in the action-prediction hierarchy. Character-trait 
attributions, on this account, provide the mindreader with an efficient and stable inferential 
basis for modeling the transient mental states of other agents. 
5. Stereotypes in the action-prediction hierarchy 
If character traits play this role in the action-prediction hierarchy, and the contents of 
stereotypes are structured around character traits, then we have the beginnings of a plausible 
hypothesis about the relationship between stereotypes and mindreading. When we apply a 
stereotype to an individual, on this view, we draw on a stored model of the generic character 
traits that we associate with a particular social group. We then use these traits to make 
inferences about that individual’s likely beliefs and desires, which in turn inform inferences 
about her behavior. So, for instance, if an individual belongs to a group that is stereotyped as 
high warmth, this raises the prior probability that they will have helpful, honest, and friendly 
intentions. Conversely, identifying someone as belonging to a low-warmth group would raise 
the prior probability that she would have harmful, deceitful, and unfriendly intentions. And, 
tentatively, if an individual belongs to a stereotypically low-competence group, her behaviors 
are more likely to be interpreted as stemming from ignorance or false beliefs, while an 
individual from a stereotypically high-competence group will be more likely to be interpreted 
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as acting on true beliefs or knowledge (for examples of ageist stereotypes about inaccurate 
memories, see Goodman et al. 1984, 1987; Mueller-Johnson et al. 2007). 
This inference may involve several steps: a stereotypic trait attribution might first 
lead to the attribution of more general, stable beliefs and desires, which might then be used 
to infer more concrete intentions, and ultimately get used to predict or interpret specific 
movements. For example, attributing a stereotype of greediness to a person might initially 
lead us to infer that she has a strong, stable desire for wealth; in a particular social interaction 
(say, a business negotiation), this broad desire attribution might lead us to a more specific 
one (e.g. she does not want to give up shares in the company), which might in turn lead us to 
particular interpretations of visible behavior (e.g. a furrowed brow signifying reluctance 
rather than contemplation) (D. R. Ames et al. 2012). Note that the stereotype does not, in 
this case, directly lead us to a specific interpretation of the agent’s behavior in a particular 
context – that kind of situation-specific information is probably not stored in the stereotype 
itself. Rather, the stereotype points us in the direction of a high-level, general mental-state 
attribution, which in turn facilitates increasingly concrete mindreading hypotheses.  
To take a concrete example, consider the case of Sagar and Schofield (1980). Their 
primary finding was that the same ambiguous action was rated as more aggressive, mean, and 
threatening when it was performed by a black actor than when it was performed by a white 
actor. According to Fiske et al. (2002), black people in the United States are rated as lower-
warmth than white people. On the current account, this is what explains the difference in 
mental-state attribution across the two groups: observers used a stereotype to make an 
inference about the stable traits of the black actor in the vignette, which led them to see the 
harmful desire as more probable than the playful/neutral one. A similar explanation can be 
given for the findings of McGlothlin and Killen (2006, 2010): whereas the ambiguous 
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actions of white actors in the images are judged to be morally neutral, participants attributed 
harmful intentions to the black actors, and thus judged their actions to be morally wrong.  
On the current proposal, participants in these studies would have first rapidly 
processed external cues about the actors’ group membership (i.e. skin color), which would 
have activated a stereotype associated with African Americans. This stereotype would 
include a cluster of personality traits, including low-warmth traits like aggressiveness, which 
would be used to develop a hierarchical model of that actor’s character and mental states. 
Upon observing the actor’s ambiguous action, the mindreader’s hierarchical model would 
generate the intentional interpretation that would be most likely given the prior hypothesis 
that the actor has the trait of aggressiveness: namely, an intention to cause harm. Thus, prior 
hypotheses about the actor’s character (based on information stored in stereotypes) would 
have influenced how the mindreader interpreted her ambiguous action. Similarly, when 
anticipating an unfamiliar agent’s actions, stereotypes about that agent’s social identity could 
be used to generate a generic model of their personality traits, which might inform action-
predictions.  
This account of stereotypes helps us understand how they lead to more 
computationally efficient (but also less accurate) mindreading. As was mentioned in the 
introduction, a single behavior can often be given indefinitely many different mentalistic 
interpretations. Some authors have argued that this problem actually makes mindreading an 
intractable problem, since every act of mentalistic interpretation will require sorting through 
an indefinitely large set of potential interpretations (Bermudez 2003; Morton 1996; Zawidzki 
2013). What stereotypes do is bias us towards a subset of those hypotheses, which we then 
use to support our behavioral predictions and interpretations. In other words, stereotypes 
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save computational resources by providing us with a heuristic for rapidly generating (what 
we take to be) relevant mentalistic interpretations of behavior. 
The high position of stereotypes within the action-prediction hierarchy can also help 
us to understand the fact that they are essentialized. Recall for a moment some of the 
characteristic features of essences: they are unobservable, they are immutable, and they are 
causally potent. These are precisely the features that we should expect to find in the highly 
abstract and stable representations that occupy the upper level of the action-prediction 
hierarchy. The upper levels of this hierarchy, after all, are meant to track very stable 
regularities in the environment, which in turn allow us to make sense of highly variable, 
transient perceptual inputs. In the domain of action-prediction, I have suggested, these 
regularities manifest as representations of temporally stable, consistent character traits that 
reliably dispose agents towards certain kinds of mental states. What stereotypes do is assign 
sets of these trait-essences to particular social groups for the purposes of predicting the 
actions of their individual members. 
Exposing this kind of relationship between mindreading and essentialist thinking 
about social groups also raises interesting questions about how the two processes interact 
over the course of development. Both theory of mind abilities and essentialist thinking about 
social groups are present in preschool-aged children across cultures (H. C. Barrett et al. 2013; 
Liu et al. 2008; Rhodes and Mandalaywala 2017); however, there are important differences in 
how the two forms of social cognition manifest themselves between childhood and 
adolescence. The basic ability to reason about more transient states, such as beliefs, desires, 
and emotions, exhibits a more-or-less cross-culturally stable developmental trajectory 
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(Shahaeian et al. 2011; Wellman et al. 2001, 2006).13 However, both the content of specific 
essentialist stereotypes, and their persistence throughout the lifespan, vary widely with 
culture and social context. For instance, essentialism about gender categories is quite 
common across most cultures, but essentialism about race and ethno-religious categories is 
not (Chalik et al. 2017; Diesendruck et al. 2013). And while most children are essentialists 
about many social groups early on, this tendency will diminish in some populations as time 
goes on (e.g. children growing up in more urban environments), but persist in others (e.g. 
children growing up in more rural environments) (Rhodes and Gelman 2009). Famously, 
essentialist thinking about particular groups also appears to be triggered in part by certain 
linguistic cues, such as generic statements (e.g. “Boys like trucks and girls like dolls,”) 
(Gelman and Roberts 2017; Rhodes et al. 2012; Segall et al. 2015). Thus, while younger 
children across different environments develop a similar basic set of theory of mind abilities, 
their reliance on particular essentialist stereotypes is greatly affected by numerous social 
factors.  
On the present account, this makes sense: while basic forms of mental-state 
attribution are used across social contexts, essentialist stereotypes provide mindreaders with 
a heuristic for rapid, specific mental-state attributions for unfamiliar members of known 
social groups. The particular groups that get essentialized will inevitably depend upon the 
salience of different group boundaries, which will be affected by a child’s first-hand 
experience with those groups, and by the way that they are talked about in the child’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 There is, of course, a huge debate about when certain theory-of-mind abilities (especially belief-attribution) 
develop (Baillargeon et al. 2010; Heyes 2014; Scholl and Leslie 2001; Wellman et al. 2001). But whether one 
believes that the core elements of theory of mind develop rapidly in the first year of life (Carruthers 2013), or 
more slowly over the first five years (Wellman 2014), there is still a general consensus that children possess a 
wide range of theory-of-mind abilities by at least four-and-a-half (Wellman et al. 2001), and display other 
relevant abilities quite a bit earlier (Behne et al. 2005; Moll and Tomasello 2006; Repacholi and Gopnik 1997; 
Wellman and Liu 2004).  
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environment. This will be something of a learning process for children, who may implicitly 
try out and then subsequently revise or discard different essentialist ideas as they learn about 
different groups. Ultimately, the way that stereotypes affect mental-state attribution should 
depend on the salience of the stereotype in the child’s experience. In this manner, a child’s 
basic theory-of-mind abilities get supplemented with higher-order, culturally local 
generalizations about the character traits of different types of individual. Thus, while we see 
cross-cultural consistency in the kinds of reasoning that occurs at lower levels of the action-
hierarchy, we get much more cultural specificity at its higher levels.  
6. Stereotypes, goals, and error-driven updating 
The present proposal suggests that stereotypes inform our mental-state attributions, and 
thereby affect our behavioral predictions. But this raises an important question: what 
happens when stereotypes yield faulty action-predictions? Shouldn’t this lead to prediction 
error signals that cause us to update the models that generated the faulty prediction – 
namely, the stereotype itself? In other words, shouldn’t a hierarchical predictive coding 
model of stereotypes ultimately lead to their elimination? 
In some circumstances, this may be precisely what happens: positive intergroup 
contact is known to reduce bias (Pettigrew and Tropp 2000). Indeed, when McGlothlin and 
Killen (2010) gave their ambiguous pictures task to children from racially heterogeneous 
schools, children were not more likely to attribute harmful intentions to the African 
American actor. Notably, with increased intergroup contact, these children would have had 
more opportunities to engage in cooperative activities with children of different races, during 
which they would have engaged in mindreading. These same children could also reasonably 
expect to engage in such cooperative activities in the future. Thus, both their past 
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experiences and future plans would push them away from inaccurate stereotype-based 
mindreading (Pettigrew and Tropp 2008). However, in the absence of such regular contact 
with members of other groups, mindreaders’ stereotypes may instead be reinforced by their 
repetition in public discourse, which creates a biased learning environment.  
Several other factors might affect the perseverance of stereotypes in our action-
prediction models. One reflects a basic challenge for any attempt to develop a predictive 
statistical model of the environment: the world is a messy place, and full of noise. If there is 
noise in the data that gets fed into a model, then it is to be expected that even highly 
accurate models will sometimes make incorrect predictions. In these cases, adjusting the 
model so that it fits the data would come at a cost to its predictive accuracy. Thus, even 
though a predictive model must be sensitive to error signals, some of these must be 
discounted as noise at least some of the time, or else run the risk of overfitting the data.  
In predictive coding models of cognition, which error signals get treated as noise and 
which ones do not can be determined by second-order predictions about the gains in 
predictive precision that would be achieved by updating one’s existing model. With 
predictive models that are expected to be largely accurate, the predictive utility of updating in 
response to an error signal would be relatively low, and so error signals will be more likely to 
be treated as noise. When models are not expected to be highly precise, the predictive 
benefits of updating would be higher, and so the system would become more sensitive to 
prediction errors. In other words, second-order predictions determine whether we ‘turn up’ 
or ‘turn down the volume’ on a given set of error signals. These modulations in the ‘volume’ 
or ‘gain’ on prediction errors manifest themselves as changes in attention (Hohwy 2012, 
2013). Thus, when we expect that certain incoming sensory inputs are likely to carry 
	   30 
information that will improve the predictive accuracy of our internal models, we pay more 
attention to those signals. 
A further factor that affects the way we update our models will be the expected value 
of incoming information with respect to our action plans. Predicting the world, after all, is 
not an end unto itself; it is a means to support adaptive behavior. Moreover, the 
computational resources we can devote to any given prediction problem are inherently 
limited. Thus, not all accurate predictions are of equal value. In general, we should expect 
the way we devote computational resources towards responding to prediction errors to vary 
as a function of the adaptive significance of the prediction problem in question. Some 
prediction problems, such as detecting predators, may not actually benefit from increased 
accuracy, given the high costs of false negatives; other problems, such as coordinating our 
behavior with other agents in the service of joint goals, may require highly accurate 
predictions (Godfrey-Smith 1991). In effect, the gain on prediction errors needs to be 
modulated by higher order predictions about the expected utility14 of updating our internal 
models.  
In practice, this will mean that the extent to which we revise our initial, stereotypic 
models in response to stereotype-inconsistent information will depend upon our goals (D. L. 
Ames and Fiske 2013; Spaulding 2017; Westra 2017). If our plans happen to depend upon 
accurately representing an individual’s mental states (say, if we think we are likely to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14 In an HPC framework, estimations of expected utility would need to rely upon affect-based, interoceptive 
predictions about the somatic and hedonic consequences of a prospective scenario (Barrett, 2017; but see 
Carruthers (2017) for a non-hedonist account of the function of valence in prospection). Contemplating 
walking down a dark alleyway in a bad neighborhood, for example, may yield a prediction about the likelihood 
of a threatening encounter, which would in turn trigger an affective response – namely, a preparation for fight 
or flight. This affective prediction could in turn support decision-making (Seligman et al. 2013), but also one’s 
subsequent sensitivity to prediction errors via the allocation of attentional resources. 
 Note also that this construal of affect would also necessarily figure in any HPC account of prejudice 
(see footnote 1). 
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cooperate with this person in the future), then we should heighten our sensitivity to 
stereotype-driven prediction errors, and update accordingly. On the other hand, if we don’t 
expect that accurately representing this individual’s mental states will make a difference to 
our plans (e.g. if we view the individual as belonging to a lower social status than us), then 
we may be more likely to dismiss prediction errors as noise. This mechanism of increasing 
and decreasing the sensitivity to prediction errors makes sense of Spaulding’s point that our 
biases affect both mindreading inputs and mindreading processing in terms of HPC: when 
our social goals are best served by reliance on stereotypes, we ignore stereotype-
disconfirming inputs, and instead rely upon generic models of other agents’ mental states. 
When our social goals instead motivate us to accurately represent an individual’s mental 
states, we devote additional cognitive resources towards integrating stereotype-disconfirming 
information into our model of their beliefs and desires. 
Notably, there may be many different contexts in which our plans require greater 
precision in our mentalistic models of other agents. I have already mentioned the potential 
for cooperation as a motivating factor: if one must engage in complex forms of coordination 
with an individual in order to achieve a joint goal (e.g. co-authoring a paper), one will then 
need a much more complex and precise model of the colleague’s beliefs, intentions, and 
perceptual states. But in less complex, highly familiar forms of cooperation (e.g. paying a 
cashier at a grocery store), less precision is necessary; in these cases, mental models are likely 
to be highly schematized and reliant on stereotypes. The amount of precision required for 
competitive or hostile interactions with out-group members will also vary depending on the 
context. In a highly strategic competitive interaction, such as a business negotiation, one 
generally needs a very elaborate model of the other agent’s goals and intentions, as 
stereotyping in these contexts will likely lead to error (D. R. Ames et al. 2012). In contrast, 
	   32 
when one is confronted by a mugger with a gun demanding one’s wallet, one does not need 
to engage in extensive planning, and so the added value of a richer, highly precise mental 
model will be quite limited. The precision of one’s predictive models of other agents’ mental 
states should thus be highly sensitive to the complexity and familiarity of the interaction in 
question, in addition to the social identities of the interacting agents.  
What happens when we do devote more resources towards representing an 
individual’s mental states? One possibility is that, as we are more strongly motivated to 
engage in accurate mindreading with a particular individual, we are more likely to explicitly, 
consciously represent another person’s experiences by projecting ourselves into their 
situation (Buckner and Carroll 2007). Explicitly representing the perspectives of other agents 
via self-projection is known to facilitate more accurate, sophisticated forms of mental-state 
attribution (Surtees et al. 2012, 2013), although it also draws heavily on working memory 
resources (Bukowski and Samson 2017; Wardlow 2013). In terms of the action-prediction 
hierarchy, this kind of perspective-taking would shift cognitive resources towards generating 
more precise predictions about the target’s transient mental states, drawing more heavily on 
one's own experiences and introspective knowledge. Rather than passively relying upon the 
top-down effects of stereotypes to shape one’s mentalistic hypotheses, this strategy leads 
mindreaders to consciously construct a richer, more detailed, ‘individuated’ representation of 
the target’s beliefs, desires, and experiences (Mason and Macrae 2004). 
Consistent with this idea, perspective-taking manipulations have been shown to lead 
people to seek out stereotype-disconfirming information, and to have a better memory for 
stereotype-inconsistent information. In a series of studies, Todd and colleagues manipulated 
whether white participants adopted the perspective of a black individual, and then proceeded 
to show them a series of 30 sentences about that individual describing behaviors that were 
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consistent, inconsistent, or neutral with respect to African-American stereotypes. After 
completing a five-minute distractor task, participants were asked to recall as many of the 
sentences as they could. They found that participants who first took the perspective of the 
target were more likely to remember stereotype-inconsistent information than those that did 
not. In another task, Todd et al. also showed that participants were more likely to choose to 
ask stereotype-disconfirming questions about a target when they first took that target’s 
perspective (Todd et al. 2012). Thus, when participants were motivated to direct more 
cognitive resources towards representing mental states of the target, they were also more 
likely to seek out and retain information that disconfirmed stereotype-based predictions.  
But while perspective-taking may be effective in mitigating the effects of stereotyping 
on the interpretation and prediction of behavior, the heavy executive demands of this 
strategy limit its applicability: in conditions of cognitive load, we should expect stereotype-
based bias in mindreading. In other words, even when a mindreader is highly motivated to 
engage in accurate mindreading, features of the context that place heavy demands on 
cognitive resources (e.g. when her working memory is occupied with multiple tasks at once) 
may lead her to rely more heavily on stereotypes.  
7. Conclusion 
I have proposed that the effects of stereotypes on mental-state attribution can be traced to 
their characterological content. The clusters of essentialized character traits contained in 
stereotypes influence other forms of mindreading by informing the relative probabilities 
ascribed to different mentalistic hypotheses, which in turn influence our predictions of 
intentional actions. In this hierarchically structured action-prediction system, stereotypes 
facilitate efficient mindreading, but also lead to biased interpretations of behavior. The 
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effects of stereotypes on mindreading can be modulated by social learning, motivational 
factors, and other features of context.  One way that stereotype-driven mindreading can be 
mitigated is through increased intergroup contact; another is via effortful, working-memory 
based forms of explicit perspective-taking. 
This proposal already has some empirical support, but could be more directly tested 
in a number of ways. The way to do this would be to follow the model of the studies 
discussed above: present participants with ambiguous scenarios and provide them with 
mental-state attribution measures, varying the social group membership of the actor across 
multiple conditions. This basic design could be supplemented with measures of stereotype 
endorsement, stereotype activation, or essentialist thinking more generally.   
Such an approach could prove highly beneficial to our understanding of the 
cognitive underpinnings of bias. There is an immense and advanced literature on the neural 
and cognitive underpinnings of mindreading, which can inform and extend our 
understanding of the way stereotypes operate in everyday situations, and help us to develop 
targeted intervention strategies to mitigate their effects. Likewise, our knowledge of 
mindreading will only benefit from a concerted effort to understand how we deploy our 
social-cognitive abilities in intergroup contexts. By studying theory of mind and stereotyping 
together, we stand to learn about the various ways that mindreading goes awry, and 
contributes to pernicious patterns of social bias.  
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